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Measuring and assessing software security is a critical concern as it is unde-
sirable to develop risky and insecure software. Various measurement approaches
and metrics have been defined to assess software security. For researchers and
software developers, it is significant to have different metrics and measurement
models at one place either to evaluate the existing measurement approaches, to
compare between two or more metrics or to be able to find the proper metric to
measure the software security at a specific software development phase. There is
no existing survey of software security metrics that covers metrics available at all
the software development phases. In this paper, we present a survey of metrics
used to assess and measure software security, and we categorized them based on
software development phases. Our findings reveal a critical lack of automated
tools, and the necessity to possess detailed knowledge or experience of the mea-
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Security of software is a difficult property to measure. However, it is important
to know if a specific system is reliable and will work properly, even when it is
attacked [23]. Researchers have suggested different metrics to evaluate if and how
vulnerable a software is to external attacks. Such measurements give the level of
inherent security in each software development phase. These metrics depend on
specific software and developmental attributes and can be used to compute the
software’s security score. Since each kind of measurement evaluates security at
different level or for specific attributes and characteristics, making a decision to
choose the proper measurements depends on the type of system security evaluation
is needed.
Metrics developed to measure a software’s security and risk level have been
designed to be quantitative [41] or objective [30], and help assess a system’s vulner-
ability risk score. Security metrics are beneficial as they reveal the reliability and
development quality for the software system. In addition, metrics can also help to
minimize the impact of a software system attack, by creating awareness about the
system weaknesses, and improving its security scale. Software metrics have been
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designed to be employed during different stages of the software life-cycle – design,
implementation and testing, deployment, and maintenance life-cycle stages. Met-
rics have been proposed to work at the abstract architectural level or the more
concrete software coding level. Examples of some popular metrics used for secu-
rity assessment include approaches like the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) [26] and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [12].
As software and technology pervades all aspects of our day-to-day life, security
researchers are devising various metrics, approaches and techniques to measure
software security [22]. At the same time, researchers, IT experts and software
developers need to have the ability to assess various types of measurements tech-
niques; to be able to compare between different security metrics in the same
category or to find a suitable metric based on it’s category or the software phase
during which the measurement is to be taken. The main goal of this research is to
present a survey for various security metrics and measurement approaches, along
with a classification of the metrics based on the software development stages. This
research will support security researchers by describing and comparing several
mechanisms in a single document. Our work will also assist others by provid-
ing the knowledge about the impact and the benefits of each metric; and which
security characteristics could be measured using certain techniques.
This thesis compiles a survey about software security and quality metrics,
and mechanisms to measure a software’s security level. The security metrics
presented here have been collected from previous research papers in the same area.
The past research works summarized in this work include security measurement
approaches that present a specific value or score to indicate the software security
on a defined scale. The metrics are categorized based on software development
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phases – including design, implementation, testing, deployment or maintenance





In this section we present related surveys on software security metrics. Mellado
et al. present some metrics that measure software security level during the design
software development phase [22]. This evaluation defines the software properties
covered by each metric. This work also compares the various metrics based on
their security properties for the design stage.
Morrison et al. also conduct a study of software security metrics [23]. Their
classification is based on conventional metrics like dependency, effort and com-
plexity. For each category, the authors describe the related papers, the software
development phases covered along with their evaluation, where possible.
Chowdhury et al. present a survey of software security measurement ap-
proaches related to the source code defects and weakness [9].
Evesti et al. focus on ”Self-Adaptive” systems in their work [14]. Self-adaptive
systems can react against attacks and have the ability to detect vulnerabilities by
observing the whole system’s security activities. The authors discuss the ad-
vantages and the difficulties to measure such systems, and present the metric’s
requirements to measure them.
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Verendel provides a survey for the quantitative approaches to measure secu-
rity [38]. This work aims to validate if software security can be measured, and if
the metric scores accurately represent the actual security risk.
Jonsson and Pirzadeh present a framework that defines metrics by dividing
them based on how the system behaves and it’s effect on the environment [16].
The authors section software characteristics into protective, behavioural and cor-
rectness features. They focus on the first and the second properties and describe
how to define metrics based on them.
Our work is different than [22] and [16] since it categorizes metrics based on
different software development phases. Morrison et al. used conventional metrics,
and mentioned phase classification, but they do not present details about metrics
and measurement approach for each phase as we do in this thesis [23]. While [14]
focuses only on security measurements for ”Self-Adaptive” systems, our survey
covers many different kinds of software systems. The survey presented by [38]
aims to validate quantitative measurements, while our work presents a detailed
survey to help researchers and software developers find different mechanisms and





In this section we describe metrics and measurement approaches used to assess
the software security state and risk in each phase of software development process.
3.1 Design Phase Metrics
Design is a very important software phase as it is one of the earliest stages
of the software development process. Failures and weaknesses discovered at this
early stage significantly reduce the risk at the later development stages. In this
section we present some important research works that have been suggested to
measure and assess the security at the design phase. Some of these mechanisms
are standards used to assist security design evaluation process, while others define
design stage metrics that have been employed to evaluate the software security
using a design file that contains the specification of the system.
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3.1.1 Towards a Measuring Framework for Security Properties of
Software [31]
This paper concentrates on determining the quantitative security properties
that can be assessed, and considers the entire software (not just some parts of
it). They use a principle and practices security list as a reference to select the
properties to assess the security properties at the design phase, such as a line of
defense, size of attack surface and complexity.
3.1.2 Security Metrics for Object-Oriented Designs [4]
The authors of this work define a set of design security metrics to measure
the security level for the flow of confidential information in multi-class programs,
especially object-oriented programs in the design phase. The metrics used in this
work are based on security quality properties for the program design, and include
the entire class design levels such as coupling, composition and design size. A note
of SPARK’s and UMLsec need be added to the design to be able to compute the
metrics using their UML tool. The result of the computation is a number between
0 and 1, with 1 being the worst. This metric can be used to evaluate more than
one design for the same program to find the most secure one.
3.1.3 Security Estimation Framework: Design Phase Perspective [29]
This work developed a framework that includes a procedure to assess security
at the design phase. The procedure includes 5 different stages that aim to find the
security factors and metrics, assess them, and finally rate the software security
level.
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3.1.4 NIST 800-55 Security Metrics Guide for Information
Technology Systems [35]
This work produced a full-system measurement approach to assess the infor-
mation system by checking if its security controls are powerful and beneficial. This
work focused on the security control implementation of the system. The authors
evolved three measurement approaches to evaluate the implementation of security
policies, effectiveness of security services delivery, and impact of security failures.
This approach supports the design development stage, and helps to take decisions
regarding security controls needed in the system.
3.1.5 Common Criteria or ISO/IEC 15408 [15]
CC or common criteria defines the product’s security functional requirements
that will be assessed and verified in the evaluation process. The result of evaluating
the product shows the security confidence level, which indicates how much it meets
the requirement defined in the common criteria.
3.1.6 An Efficient Measurement of Object Oriented Design
Vulnerability [1]
In this work the authors present a metric, called the vulnerability propagation
factor (VPF), to measure the risk level of software. The assessment is based on
how the classes communicate, and the possibility of spreading the vulnerability
from one class to the other classes on the tree-like structure of the object-oriented
design. The result of VPF is based on the number of affected classes for each
vulnerable class; and lower VPF value, means lower risk level of the software
design.
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3.1.7 Design Phase Metrics Comparison
According to the research papers we have discuss above, we will show a com-
parison between their metrics, measurement approaches and standards. We found
that The frameworks presented in [31] and [29], and the VPF metric in [1] can
be used to assess the security of the overall software. All of the design metrics
and standards show a result (i.e numrical, risk categories or levels) that can be
used to compare the security of various designs. While the frameworks in [31]
and [29], NIST 800-55, and CC (ISO/IEC 15408) can be used to assess any type
of software designs, the metrics presented in [4] and VPF in [1] can only assess
object-oriented designs.
3.2 Implementation and Testing Phase Metrics
There are several software defects that cannot be discovered early in the de-
sign phase. It is important and most cost efficient to detect such defects in the
implementation software development phase to minimize their risk to the later
phases. Researchers have developed several metrics to assess the security ap-
proaches employed to find vulnerabilities and assess the software risk during the
implementation stage. When the software is implemented, it’s significant to guar-
antee that it’s reliable and secure before it is deployed. In this section we describe
some of metrics to measure the level of security of the software source code during
he implementation and testing phases.
3.2.1 Security Metrics for Source Code Structures [9]
This work defines three metrics to assess the soundness of a system’s source
code structures. The assessed security level is based on finding source code defects
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and weaknesses. Coupling corruption propagation is one of the metrics presented
to measure how defects and weakness in one part of the software affects other
methods in the source code. The other two metrics presented are stall ratio and
critical element ratio; the first one is about finding the statements that don’t let
the program make progress and they focus here on such statements in the loop.
The last metric finds possible paths an unauthorized input could take that will
lead to an attack on the code.
3.2.2 Prioritization of software security intangible attributes [11]
This approach proposes using code properties that can be measured to estimate
those that are more difficult to quantify, like software security. It works using
the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) computation to assess the measurable
attributes scores, and the assessment of system stakeholders using two-dimensional
approach that uses an attributes’ hierarchy. The main attributes are the intangible
properties, then there are one or more levels of sub-attributes used to get the
security priority score for the main one.
3.2.3 Side-channel vulnerability factor: a metric for measuring
information leakage [13]
The authors of this work define Side-channel vulnerability factor (SVF) as
a security metric to measure the level of infiltration of the information which
attacker can gain. The SVF metric is based on the patterns the attacker might
use, and the execution patterns in the machine that could be attacked. This
metric computes the interconnection between the two kinds of patterns to get
the level of difficulty to attack the system and be able to exploit the information
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leakage.
3.2.4 Deploying Suitable Countermeasures to Solve the Security
Problems within an E-learning Environment [27]
This work explores the security issues and their exposures for E-learning sys-
tems, including techniques to fix some of these security problems. The authors
present Mean Failure Cost (MFC) metric which depends on 4 elements: stakes, de-
pendability, impact and threat vector. They explore some security metrics trying
to minimize the effect of the stakes factor.
3.2.5 A Hierarchical Security Assessment Model for Object-Oriented
Programs [5]
This work propose a multi-level tree-like model to measure the security of
object oriented programs, especially the one written in Java. This security as-
sessment is based on the properties of the code structure; it also depends on the
static analysis where they evolve an automatic tool that works with Java bytecode
after compiling. The security level final score is based on the classified data, and
computed in different levels. The first level includes design properties obtained
by the static analysis, then use them to get the metrics to assess upper-level of
design properties in the next level. The third level uses the second level metrics
to measure design concepts. The metrics are combined to get the final result of
security evaluation of the system. This approach is for the developer, as it allows
to compare the security level of two versions of a specific program.
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3.2.6 A New Security Sensitivity Measurement for Software
Variables [8]
The authors present a new metric to measure the full-system security level.
It is based on the possibility of violating security properties when the system get
attacked at the variable level. This metric uses model checking to verify for each
security property if it will be violated when an attack occur. The measurement
only uses the risky variables in the program code to assess the security level. This
metric helps to minimize the security weaknesses and defects in the later stages;
also it just focuses on the risky parts of the code, which is better than looking at
the whole code as that might take a long time.
3.2.7 Evaluating Security Controls Based on Key Performance
Indicators and Stakeholder Mission [32]
This work presents a Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) that
helps to improve the security when the system operates, and to develop a secure
system. CSES assesses the cost of possible violations of the system security for
each stakeholder when it gets attacked using the mean failure cost. Determining
the possible lose goes through computing stakeholder matrix, dependency matrix,
impact matrix and threat matrix. Having the knowledge of the potential loss for
each stakeholder in the system helps to manage and maintain the security risk.
3.2.8 Is Complexity Really the Enemy of Software Security? [33]
This paper investigates if the complexity of the source code impacts the vul-
nerability of software. The study in this paper is accomplished by assessing some
of complexity metrics (i.e nesting complexity, paths and other 7 metrics) statically
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at code-level to verify if the complexity is a valid indicator to high security risk
of the system.
3.2.9 Implementation and Testing Phase Metrics Comparison
We discuss here a comparison between the security metrics that could be used
to assess security during implementation and testing phase based on the research
papers we have discussed above. We found that the metrics in [9], [11], [13], [5], [8]
and [33] don’t assess the security of the overall system. While measuring security
in [9], [5] and [33] based on some of the code structure properties, It’s depends on
some security properties in [11], [13] and [8]. The final score of all implementation
and testing phase metrics can be used to compare the security of different source
codes (i.e numrical score); however, metrics in [27] and [32] used to maintain
and monitor the systems. All measurement approaches can assess any type of
system except those in [27] and [32] which assess large systems (i.e systems that
has many users), and the measurement model in [5] which only evaluates object
oriented source code.
3.3 Deployment Phase Metrics
Independent of the assessment performed (or not) by the software developers,
it is also important for the software end-user to know if the software is secure, and
to be able to compare the security risk level of different software products that
provide similar levels of functionality so that they may choose the most secure one.
There are some tools and metrics that have been proposed to enable measuring
the level of software security by the end-user. In this section we present the most
prominent software security metrics that can be employed by the end-users of
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software, as they do not rely on any design or development-time knowledge or
availability of source-code.
3.3.1 Analyses Of Two End-User Software Vulnerability Exposure
Metrics [43]
This work defines two vulnerability exposure metrics that could be used by the
end-user to assess the security exposure, and to be able to compare between two
similar software products. These metrics are based on the number of vulnerabili-
ties that have been detected and notified to the distributor, and the software life
duration (how fast are the vulnerabilities fixed since they were discovered). One
of the metrics is (AAV) average active vulnerabilities, which defines the average
number of vulnerabilities for specific software that has been reported to and fixed
by the software distributor; and the other one is (VFD) vulnerability free days
metric that defines the likelihood of not having any live vulnerabilities in a certain
day.
3.3.2 How dangerous is your Android app?: an evaluation
methodology [6]
This paper presents a new security risk analyser that could be used by the
end-user to assess software security for Android applications. This analyser uses
both static and dynamic analysis. It works by finding the authorizations needed
by the app, and then compares the authorizations with the tasks that the end-user
has called in the run-time. Finer-grained models are used to profile the discovered
risks based on it’s risk classifications; and fuzzy logic approach is used to assess
these risks. The final result of the analyser is a risk score, and the finer-grained
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classification report.
3.3.3 Measuring the attack surfaces of two FTP daemons [20]
The authors of this paper use the attack surface measurement approach to
compare between different FTP server implementations. They choose ProfFTPD
and Wu-FTPD, the most popular and open source FTP servers for this work.
The comparison between the servers is based on the attack surface of the data,
the channels and the number of methods. The measurement result is verified by
looking at the co-relation between the number of vulnerabilities discovered in the
past for each server implementation, and the attack surface metric result for each
server.
3.3.4 Ontology-based Security Assessment for Software Products [40]
This work presents an evaluation of the trust of a software system by building
an ontology for maintaining vulnerabilities. The ontology helps by providing infor-
mation about the security-relevant functional and non-functional requirements of
the software. The ontology also shows the proof of confidence regarding whether
or not the software system is free of vulnerabilities. The approach depends on
different standards like CVSS and CWE. To support the ontology approach, a
self-controlled tool was also developed to assess the level of the software trustwor-
thiness.
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3.3.5 EVMAT: an OVAL and NVD based enterprise vulnerability
modeling and assessment tool [44]
In this work, the authors implement a tool called EVMAT that automatically
computes the score of enterprise vulnerability. They use a topology for modelling
vulnerability by giving a weight to all of the company objectives, then use CVSS
to find the severity score for each objective. EVMAT uses OVAL to collect the
information about the software system features related to all resources, and NVD
to get information about each vulnerability.
3.3.6 A model for quantitative security measurement and
prioritization of vulnerability mitigation [37]
In this paper, the authors present a model for assessing the security risk quan-
titatively for each node in a network system. The measurement formula depends
on gathering the vulnerabilities of a specific node, assessing their risk scores, and
ordering them based on their roles and effects inside the network.
3.3.7 Security Metrics for Software Systems [41]
The authors in this work develop a tool to assess the trust level of software
systems. This approach depends on the flaws that lead to higher number of system
attacks, their risk scores and how frequent each vulnerability related to that flaw
will occur. The authors get the list of vulnerabilities for the software system from
the CVE database.
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3.3.8 Temporal metrics for software vulnerabilities [42]
In this work, the authors try to adjust the metrics’ equations provided by
CVSS 2.0. They discuss that the CVSS 2.0 equations have an issue about the the
impact score; if the impact is high or low, the score will be the same. They adjust
f(impact) so it has multiple cases to represent integrity impact, confidentiality
impact and availability impact accurately in the base score equation. In this
paper, they focused more on adjusting temporal and environmental equations. A
tool with an interface was also developed to help the end-user calculate the score
automatically.
3.3.9 An Approach to Measuring a System’s Attack Surface [17]
The paper presents an approach that uses the system attack surface resources
as indicator to the security level for specific software. This technique provides
the ability for end-users and developers to compare between two software’s secu-
rity levels. The metric computation is based on the system data, methods and
channels.
3.3.10 An Approach to Analyzing the Windows and Linux Security
Models [34]
This work presents different metrics to assess an operating system’s risk level.
This measurement is based on the possibility of privilege violations caused by one
of the OS characteristics. Different formulae are presented for the various OS to
measure risk. However, using these metrics needs an expert user. The risk level
could be concluded from the final result of the specific formula for each specific
OS.
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3.3.11 Experimenting with Quantitative Evaluation Tools for
Monitoring Operational Security [24]
The paper presents a tools to help the administrator monitors and maintains
the security level of the system. It shows the vulnerabilities in the system using a
privilege graph, which is a tree-like structure. The security metrics employed here
are computed using a Markovian approach, which is based on the potential paths
the attacker could use to attack the system using the privilege graph. The result
reflects the likelihood of attacking the system. The result is achieved using mean
effort to failure (METF) metric; the lower the value of the metric, the higher the
indicated risk level, and lower security level of the system.
3.3.12 SAVI: Static-Analysis Vulnerability Indicator [39]
The authors in this paper present a security measurement approach based
on analyzing the source code statically for open-source web applications. The
analysis inspects the potential vulnerabilities in the system, and then use them
to compute the security measure. They propose a static analysis vulnerability
indicator (SAVI) to compare between two or more applications based on their
source code, to find the one that is most secure. This approach can only be used
for open-source deployed software as it requires the source code.
3.3.13 Deployment Phase Metrics Comparison
We present a comparison between deployment phase security metrics and
measurement approaches discussed above. The measurement approaches used
in [6], [44], [37] [34], [24] and [39] can be used only to assess specific type of soft-
ware. In [6], only andorid application can be evaluated; and in [44] and [24] secu-
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rity assessments for enterprise systems presented. In addition, the network nodes
risk level assessed (They didn’t compute the risk level of the overall network)
in [37]; and in [34] different metrics to assess the security of various operating
systems described. SAVI metric presented in [39] can only used to evaluate the
security of the deployed open source software as it requires the availability of the
source code. All of the presented metrics show a quantitative result which help
to either compare the security or risk level of different software that has the same
level of functionality, or to maintain and monitor the system security. Vulnera-
bility databases used to assist the software security evaluation in [40], [44], [37]
and [41]. The metrics used in [17] and [20] are based on assessing the security of
the attack surface; and the measurement model in [6] and the metric in [39] use
static analysis to measure the software security.
3.4 Maintenance Phase Metrics
Software developers also need to measure the software risk level in the main-
tenance stage. The evaluation during this stage is either to guarantee that the
software is still secure, to check it’s security level when it get attacked, or to check
it’s security after making some changes on the software. This section presents
some of the security metrics that have been devised for developers (rather than
end-users) to be used in the maintenance phase.
3.4.1 Using Software Structure to Predict Vulnerability Exploitation
Potential [45]
To improve the measurement results of evaluating the vulnerabilities risk, and
to minimize the need of user interference to supply the information needed to
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measure the risk level, the authors presents a metric that depends on some of the
software characteristics like reachability, existence of risky call, and entry point.
The authors built a predictor that works using a machine learning approach and
SVMS to determine the vulnerabilities exposure and effect.
3.4.2 Using Attack Surface Entry Points and Reachability Analysis to
Assess the Risk of Software Vulnerability Exploitability [46]
Security metrics employing the CVSS metrics have a weakness since they don’t
examine the influence of the software characteristics during measuring the risk
level. This work defines a metric that focuses on the software characteristics
and design, while being based on vulnerability reachability. Whenever there is a
vulnerability that could be exploited through an entry point using a system call,
that entry point risk will be estimated by computing the ratio of the software’s
attribute privileges and types to the rights needed to attack it.
3.4.3 Enterprise Software Management Systems by Using Security
Metrics [7]
This paper presents a scheme for ordering vulnerability priorities based on
common vulnerability scoring system(CVSS). It describes base, temporal and en-
vironmental metrics used in CVSS. The authors also present number of operational
metrics that could assess systems of large business, and can be used by managers,
operational team, IT team and some other metrics.
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3.4.4 Taxonomy of quality metrics for assessing assurance of security
correctness [25]
This work proposes a classification that aims to show the quality level of the
process of proving and validating the security accuracy. This process is a part
of security assurance, and the quality properties needed are represented in the
CC and ISO-IEC 15408, and the level accomplished is represented by SSE-CMM.
This technique gives a quantified result which helps to simplify maintaining the
operational phase’s security procedure.
3.4.5 Comparing Vulnerability Severity and Exploits Using
Case-Control Studies [2]
The authors propose to check the validation of vulnerabilities’ severity scores
as risk level indicators. A case-control approach is used to evaluate vulnerability
and the data that could be used to attack the system. In addition, they check the
validity of CVSS severity scores as risk level indicators, and they use a couple of
elements that affect the risk level to improve the CVSS risk indicator accuracy.
3.4.6 Estimating risk levels for vulnerability categories using
CVSS [36]
This work aims to improve the accuracy of measuring the security of a system.
It puts vulnerability under specific classification, and tries to assess the risk level
for each group of vulnerabilities. From the score of each group, it computes
the final risk level for the whole system. This approach also uses vulnerability
prioritization to determine what causes high risk in the system.
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3.4.7 Maintenance Phase Metrics Comparison
We present a comparison of the metrics to assess security of the maintenance
phase. All of them can evaluate the security for any type of software except the
one in [7] which only measures the security of the enterprise system. While the
metrics in [45] and [46] are based on software characteristics (i.e like reachability,
existence of risky call, and entry point), those in [36], [2] and [7] are based on
CVSS. The final result includes the scores of all the known vulnerability only
in [25] and [36]. In addition, the final result of all metrics expect the one in [45]
can be used to to monitor and maintain the software security, or to compare
between two versions of the software; The metric in [45] don’t show a security or
risk score, it just shows if there is a vulnerabilities could lead to attack the system.
3.5 Multiple Phases Metrics
In this section, we discuss some of the metrics, approaches or tools that could
be used during more than one phase of software development.
Design , Testing and Implementation Phase
3.5.1 Complexity, Coupling, and Cohesion Metrics be Used as Early
Indicators of Vulnerabilities? [10]
As it is significant to increase the security level in the early stages of software
development, the authors examine complexity, coupling and cohesion (CCC) met-
rics to explore if having less cohesive systems with greater coupling and complexity
is a valid indicator to higher system risk. If the relation between CCC and the
higher risk is determined, then they explore which one of the CCC metrics could
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be used to assess the system security.
3.5.2 Automated software architecture security risk analysis using
formalized signatures: Metric to measure the security at
different architecture levels through the development cycle [3]
The authors present a scheme for detecting the system weakness during design
and implementation phase, and a tool to analyse the system architecture of secu-
rity defects. This scheme is based on security metrics and scenarios, and object
constraint language (OCL). The formal OCL signature is used to find if there is a
match for it in the system or to assess the security. Detecting a match indicates
that system could be exposed to such an attack.
3.5.3 CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) [21]
CWE helps to improve and manage the security level of software beside as-
sisting security tools. It shows the weakness that can be evaluated for specific
software in the implementation, operational and design phases.
Design and Deployment
3.5.4 A tool for security metrics modeling and visualization [19]
This work proposes MVS 2.0, which is a tool developed to assess and maintain
the security in the system during the design and deployment phases. It includes
various metrics ordered from the most comprehensive, which is located in the lower
level, and less details can be given as we move up to the higher levels. This tool
connects metrics with the system security details such as security requirements
and controls to make it easy for the user to monitor the system, and this data is
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always updated when there is an update or change in the system while it runs.
Implementation and Maintenance
3.5.5 An Analyzer-based Software Security Measurement Model for
Enhancing Software System Security [18]
The paper presents an approach that uses the analysis to gather security met-
rics over software. It helps to detect security weaknesses so it can be maintained
to reduce software risk. Static analysis is used to collect the software security
metrics during implementation phase (i.e code-level metrics). In other side, they
use dynamic analysis to gather the maintenance phase metrics. In order to get
the software security level, both metrics from static and dynamic analysis are




In this thesis, we present a survey of security metrics and measurement ap-
proaches categorized by software development phases. In this section we describe
some of the main findings of this work.
We found that researchers have developed many different metrics to measure
the security level of software. While some metrics can only be used in one phase
of software development, there are others that can be used over multiple phases.
However, many current metrics don’t show the security level for the overall soft-
ware. Instead, several metrics represent a partial score that only covers some of
the security properties. Likewise, some metrics just represent the score of one
vulnerability in that software, which is less beneficial unless there is another way
to utilize such partial scores to get an overall (security) value.
We also found that many metrics use the comprehensive CVE, NVD or other
vulnerabilities databases to get a list of vulnerabilities and their details, which they
need and use for their formulae and computations. Most popular vulnerability
databases use a complex scoring system to compute the severity score of each
discovered/reported vulnerability. CVSS [26] is the most popular standard open
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scoring system (used by NVD) that helps an organization estimates its system
vulnerability risks. The severity score in CVSS is based on base, temporal and
environmental metrics. The computation formula for each of these main metrics
is in turn based on a number of other sub-metrics that depend on the properties
of the discovered vulnerability. Environmental score is based on the temporal
score, which depends on the base score. The final CVSS score can be 10 or lower,
with the higher number indicating a higher risk level. Another scoring system
is CMSS [28] to assess the risk level of the misuse vulnerabilities that help in
attacking the system. The CMSS score derived from the CVSS and its scoring
formula based on the three metrics: base, environmental and temporal metrics.
We decided to focus our effort in this survey on automated tools that don’t
need human intervention. We discovered that there are only a few such tools.
One such automated tool was presented in [6], which is designed to analyse and
measure the risk level of Android applications. This tool can enable the end-user
to make a security decision either by giving the final risk score as a numerical
value and it’s corresponding category (i.e low, average, high and not acceptable).
It can also provide details about the operations that may cause risky behavior for
the application, as well as the risk category for each one. Such analysis is helpful
and significant to know, and can allow the user to make an installation decision
based on the application’s risk factor.
Another automated security measurement tool was proposed in [40]. This tool
uses an ontology to maintain and monitor the vulnerabilities. The final result of
the analysis shows the evidence of the trustworthiness (i.e the evidence that the
software doesn’t include any vulnerability) of the software. However, operating
this tool needs some manual information, such as the temporal exploitability and
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report confidence scores from the user to start the analysis. While this tool is
compatible with all software binaries, the score given by this tool is based on the
reported vulnerabilities retrieved by the ontology from the NVD database. As a
result, its score may not be accurate as it doesn’t cover any undetected defects
and vulnerabilities.
EVMAT [44] is another automated tool developed to calculate the overall vul-
nerability score of an entire enterprise system. It can be used by system adminis-
trators as it requires some knowledge to specify accurate weights for the all of the
system resources. The vulnerability details and resources features are automati-
cally retrieved to be used in the final security score computation. This tool also
uses the NVD database to get vulnerabilities informations. As the tool mentioned
previously in [40], this tool also covers only the reported NVD vulnerabilities in
it’s computation.
Wang et al. also reveal a tool to calculate the adjusted CVSS metrics [42].
This tool is also not fully automated; however, the tool provides some information
regarding the properties of attributes it needs to calculate its score.
A predictor was developed in [45] with the aim of minimizing the knowledge
needed from the user. This approach uses machine learning and SVMS. It acquires
some knowledge of the software structure properties, so it can also be used by
developers. This tool does not measure the risk or security level of the system.
Instead, it just tries to conclude if vulnerabilities could be used to attack the
system or not.
Another tool, called MVS 2.0 [19], was developed to evaluate the system secu-
rity during the design and deployment development stages. It needs some knowl-
edge about MVS, how it works and it’s output. This tool can be used by expert
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users and developers who have the knowledge and the experience of how to use it.
Based on our exploration, we conclude that there is a general lack of auto-
mated tools for end-users to conveniently score the security of deployed software.
This limitation is a serious issue only for measuring the software security in the
deployment stage. However, automation for all phases will result in more accurate
measurement than manual entry of the information, which might result in simple
data or enormous database entries. Some of the tools also need knowledge or ex-
perience that the end-user at the deployment stage may not possess. In addition,
tools that could be used by the end-user and don’t require any knowledge are
often restricted to specific kinds of applications or software, or it might be related




This thesis conducted a survey of security metrics, and categorized them based
on the software development stages. Our survey collects many important research
works for security metrics and tools that measure the security or risk level of
software. Our survey found a general lack of automated security measurement
tools, especially for use by end-users in the deployment stage. Tools that need
more user interference also necessitates more knowledge to use the tool. Some
automated tools can be used only for specific types of software. We expect that
this survey will help developers and researchers to understand the state of art
in security metrics approaches and tools to measure security. This knowledge
will help researchers develop better metrics and automated tools to advance the
measurement of software security.
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